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STANDARD FAMILY COURT ACT
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Journal No. 2 (1959)
Reviewed by
FREDERICK J. LUDWIG*

"Not this Man but Barabbas." The cry
has re-echoed for two thousand years. Despite the vastness of their empires and their
billions in gold, the followers of Barabbas
are frank failures in the management of
marriage and its consequences. The most
Barabbasque of modern nations has confessed failure in its experiment to abolish
forthwith the family structure. Other nations, marked for their material advancement, have experienced a decrease of family
ties almost in direct ratio to increase of
national income. In Great Britain, divorces
and separations increased from 500 to
50,000 per year in the first half of the
twentieth century. In the United States,
while national income was increasing
almost a third between 1948 and 1955,
juvenile court cases increased more than
two-thirds. This Man raised marriage alone
among all human transactions to the divine
dignity of a Sacrament. No nation has been
sane enough to follow His way. The patchwork of poultices provided by human laws
has failed to save marriage. How can nat-
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uralistic remedies alone eliminate evils that
arise directly from ignoring the supernatural
nature of marriage?
A family court structure, ideally conceived by naturalistic standards,. may not
succeed in saving marriage; it can alleviate
abuses arising from overlapping and fragmentation of court jurisdiction over family
problems. To take an extreme example,
there are as many as thirty-eight different
courts and parts of courts that may have
to be resorted to in order to provide a legal
solution to the related difficulties of a single family in the City of New York. A wife
may have her husband brought before the
district Magistrate's Court for a perennial
problem euphemistically labelled "family
'fight." If a-ilow was struck, the husband
may have to face trial in another court,
Special Sessions, before three justices. If
the wife complains also of non-support, she
can be aided neither by the Magistrate's,
nor Special Sessions courts. Still another
court, the Domestic Relations, Family Part,
will have to be resorted to. If the suggested
solution is a permanent separation, she
must go to the Supreme Court, where the
usual requirement of retaining counsel

BOOK REVIEWS

might well make this proceeding unavailable to the poor. If the son of this unfortunate union comes into conflict with the
law, the jurisdiction of any one of a dozen
courts, or their parts, may- be invoked. If
the conflict is a criminal one not involving
the penalty of death or life imprisonment,
then the Children's Court part of the Domestic Relations Court will have exclusive
jurisdiction if the youngster is under sixteen
at the time of committing the offense. If
the youth is over sixteen at the time of
commission, but has not yet reached his
nineteenth birthday, then the court having
jurisdiction may depend upon the part of
the city in which the offense was committed.
If in Brooklyn, Queens, or Richmond, the
matter may be brought to the Adolescents'
Court, a part of the Magistrate's Court, or
in other parts of the city to the Youth Part
of the Court of Special Sessions. If this
youth has committed an offense of the
grade of felony, then he is subject to the
Youth Part of the Court of General Sessions, if the offense was committed in Manhattan, or to a similar part of the County
Court, if committed in other parts of the
city. If the daughter of this hapless couple
gives birth to a child out of wedlock, then
the court having jurisdiction to determine
paternity and support would be that of
Special Sessions.
A sound court system ought to provide
a just method of dispute-settling so as to
avoid resort to self-help. That method
should also be convenient and expeditious.
A litigant should not be required to run
the risk of going to the wrong court; or, if
he has gone to the right court, to learn that
it can only dispose of a small segment of
the entire controversy. The proposed Standard Family Court Act certainly meets this
shortcoming in resolving family disputes.

The Act is the work of committees of lawyers and social workers representing three
major groups concerned with families in
conflict with the law: the NPPA, the Children's Bureau, and the Council of Juvenile
Court Judges. It represents the maximum
that a social worker might demand of a
Family Court, and at the same time offers
the careful draftsmanship of bold-faced
statutory text and explanatory comment
that would satisfy a committee of the American Law Institute. The Act sets up a unified tribunal with power over virtually every
family difficulty involving the law. Children
under eighteen would be subject to this
court, not only in proceedings for delinquency and neglect, but also for custody
and support, even when arising out of
matrimonial actions. Adoption and paternity proceedings would be vested in
this court. Adults would also be subject to
the court's jurisdiction in all of these proceedings. In addition, the court would have
control over adults for all crimes committed against their children, crimes less
than felonies committed against any children, and commitment in lunacy proceedings. Finally, the proposed Act gives the
Family Court jurisdiction over divorce, annulment, separation, and matters of support and custody incidental thereto.
One defect of the proposed Act is that
it would stretch the span of specialization
of its judges beyond the breaking point.
Early American state court systems were
based on Coke's idea, expressed in his
Fourth Institute, of a series of specialized
courts. The New York system, dating from
1846, embodies this notion. Such specialization of courts produces conflicts of
jurisdiction with the consequence of concentration on these abstruse questions at
the expense of those relating to the merits

5

of the case. When meritorious controversies are thrown out on jurisdictional
grounds, they must be relitigated. This
wastes the time, money, effort, and ingenuity of court, counsel, litigants, and
witnesses. A series of fragmentary dispositions of a single, entire controversy may
produce a result considerably at variance
with one disposition by a unified tribunal.
And separate courts dealing with a single
dispute may cause successive appeals that
unnecessarily burden appellate courts. The
superior system, suggested by equity jurisprudence, would be a unified tribunal
staffed with specialist judges.
It is this superior principle that is
strained by the proposed Act. A district
judge sitting in the proposed Family Court
may have special talent for resolving cases
of delinquent and neglected children in
which issues of fact seldom arise, procedure
is informal, and counsel almost never appear. Does such skill suggest the temperament and training necessary for the conduct
of the trial before jury of a felony indictment against an adult? Does it imply special
ability to deal with the involved issues of
law that may arise out of a matrimonial
action and that can be resolved only after
consideration of competing principles of
private international law that are pressed
by carefully prepared counsel? Aptitude for
settling family fights might well be correlated with the proposed duty of the Family
Court judge to supervise marriage counselling attached to his court. But there is no
reason to suppose that such a judge would
be expert in ruling upon the admissibility
of evidence and in summing up to a jury.
In insisting that so many different sorts of
duties be assumed by a single judge, there
is serious risk that the weighty interest in
maintaining the integrated viewpoint of
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the family might be overbalanced by the
equally weighty interest in having a judge
and tribunal specially adapted to the demands of a particular case.
Perhaps this objection could be overcome by vesting some of the jurisdiction
of the proposed Family Court concurrently
rather than exclusively. The Judicial Conference of the State of New York, sympathetic to the idea of a unified Family
Court, proposed in 1958 such a court
without jurisdiction over trial of felonies
before juries, or over matrimonial actions.
This might well be an acceptable first step
in striking a balance between the interest
in a specialist judge and that of -providing
unified service for an integrated problem.
The proposed Act also would have the
judges on the Family Court rank with those
of the highest state tribunal with trial jurisdiction. This poses an acute political problem in most states. Objectively, there is
no sound reason why the disposition of
family problems ought not to enjoy the
same prestige as the disposition of monetary disputes. But in insisting that the
proposed Family Court have power to
mandate its budget from the Legislature,
the proponents of the Act go beyond the
necessities of maintaining the independence
of the judiciary. Such provisions may be
justifiable in special situations, such as that
of the Supreme Court within the City of
New York when almost a third of the liti-.
gation in that court involves the municipality and there is danger of budgetary
reprisal for adverse decisions. No such
situation would be conceivable in a Family
Court. Such power to mandate a budget
would indeed invade the province of the
Legislature to apportion funds available for
family purposes among various agencies,
judicial and non-judicial.

